Design of Coordinated Action II

he faced a challenge and he designed  a novel response.

It is often said that a strategy is a choice of a decision.  The words "choice' and "decision" evoke an image of someone considering a list of alternatives and then selecting one of them.  There is, in fact, a formal theory of decisions that specifies exactly how to make a choice by identifying alternative actions, valuing outcomes, and appraising probabilities of events.  The problem with this view, and the reason it barley lightens a leader's burden, is that you are rarely handed a clear set of alternatives.

In the case at hand, Hannibal was certainly not briefed by a staff presenting four options arranged on a PowerPoint slide.  Rather, he faced a challenge and he designed  a novel response.  Today, as then, many effective strategies are more designs than decisions--are more constructed than chosen.  In these cases, doing strategy is more like designing a high-performance aircraft than deciding which forklift truck to buy or how large to build a new factory.  

ACTION POINT: When someone says "Managers are decision makers," they are not talking about master strategists, for a master strategist is a designer.

Design of Coordinated Action

It was not expected that they would re-form and attack the main body of infantry. 

Hannibal's strategy at Cannae was an astoundingly adroit construction of coordinated actions orchestrated in time and in space.  In 216 B.C., the fundamental formula for military success was fairly basic:  keeping in formation, keeping discipline, and keeping troops from panicking and running. 

Therefore, when a Roman saw the enemy retreat, it looked like victory.  The idea that a commander could convince warlike Gauls and Spaniards into a mock retreat was almost unthinkable.  Furthermore, the normal pattern in ancient battle was that cavalry, after vanquishing the opposing cavalry, would chase fleeing disorganized horsemen and soldiers.  It was not expected that they would re-form and attack the main body of infantry.  The Carthaginian army's competence and discipline at carrying out a complex series of movements by different units --unit that were physically separated but acting in preplanned cohesion around a central design--was surprise.  No army before Hannibal's had executed such choreographed multiple movements in time and space.

ACTION POINT: What coordinated actions can be carried out to surprise the competition or the market?

Practice Comes First

Decision makers need to factor into their present decisions the “future that has already happened.”

Decision makers-in government, in the universities, in business, in the labor unions, in churches-need to factor into their present decisions the future that has already happened.  For this they need to know what events have already occurred that do not fit into their present-day assumptions, and thereby create new realities.

Intellectuals and scholars tend to believe that ideas come first, which then lead to new political, social, economic, psychological realities.  This does happen, but it is the exception.  As a rule theory does not precede practice.  Its role is to structure and codify already proven practice.  Its role is to convert the isolated and “atypical” from exception to “rule” and “system” and therefore into something that can be learned and taught and, above all, into something that can be generally applied.

ACTION POINT: Are the premises that you base your decisions on obsolete? Do you need a new intellectual frame work to win in the market, as it exists today?

Anticipation

In game theory one presumes that the opponent is as rational as oneself.  It is clear that Hannibal did not make that presumption. 

A fundamental ingredient in a strategy is a judgment or anticipation concerning the thoughts and/or behavior of others.  The simplest way of looking at Cannae is that Hannibal surrounded, or enveloped, the Romans.  But that is incomplete, for the Roman legions were the more mobile infantry on that field.  Actually, the legions were enticed into becoming enveloped, enticed into a trap, their own mobility, courage, and even initiative turned against them.   The very essence of Cannae was that the bars of the trap--the compression of the legions' ranks--were forged, in part, by the Romans' own vigorous responses to Hannibal's enticements. 

In game theory one presumes that the opponent is as rational as oneself.  It is clear that Hannibal did not make that presumption.  However, individually rational the Romans might have been, he saw the Roman army as an organization with a history, traditions, doctrine, and standardized training.  Furthermore, that organizations leaders had identifiable motivations and biases.  Some of the Roman leaders were known to be proud and a bit impetuous.

Hannibal knew these things because Carthage had fought Rome ten years earlier and came to understand its military system.  Also, part of the Roman behavior at Cannae was predictable because Hannibal had worked to shape it, raiding Varro's camp the night before, angering and embarrassing the consul in front of his troops, pushing him to seek immediate battle.  Finally, elements of Roman behavior were predictable because the battle developed quickly, giving the Romans little time to study the situation and no time to learn new lessons and alter their methods.

ACTION POINT: Don't presume, anticipate and study and know your competition.

Premeditation

By definition, winging it is not strategy.

Cannae was not an improvisation; it was designed and planned in advance.  Hannibal executed such choreographed strategies not just once, but many times in his years of war with Rome.

There are furious debates over the best balance, in a strategy, between prior guidance and on-the-spot adaptation and improvisation, but there is always some form of prior guidance.  By definition, winging it is not strategy.

ACTION POINT: Make the most of prior guidance and balance planning with adaptation and improvisation.